סמינר המכון להיסטוריה ופילוסופיה של המדעים והרעיונות ע"ש כהן
Mauricio Suarez
Complutense University
Propensities and pragmatism
Commentator: Ittay Nissan-Rozen, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
The paper outlines a genuinely pragmatist conception of propensity, and defends it against common objections to the propensity interpretation of probability, prominently Humphreys’ paradox. It reviews the paradox in detail and identifies one of its key assumptions, the identity thesis, according to which propensities are probabilities (under a suitable interpretation of Kolmogorov’s axioms). The identity thesis is also involved in empiricist propensity interpretations deriving from Popper’s influential original proposal, and makes such interpretations untenable. As an alternative, I shall urge a return to Charles Peirce’s original insights on probabilistic dispositions, and offers a reconstructed version of his pragmatist conception, which rejects the identity thesis.
התכנסות לקפה וכיבוד קל בשעה 17:45, ליד חדר 449
יו"ר: פרופ' יוסי שוורץ